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ABSTRACT
We describe how an electromagnetic wave after a lightning strike affected a university hospital, including
the communication shutdown that followed, the way it was handled, and the lessons learned from this
incident. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2015;9:440-443)
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The literature has abundant examples of naturalor human-generated disasters as well as thehospital preparedness and related training
necessary to face those kinds of events. Less frequent
are reports on in-hospital incidents and their con-
sequences, in particular, lightning strikes. Most of
these incidents are reported in local newspapers only.
We describe here a lightning strike in the proximity of
a university hospital that disabled all landlines and
paging communications in 2007, the way the incident
was managed, and the lessons to be learned.
NARRATIVE
The Lausanne University Hospital is a tertiary
medical center with about 1500 beds. It is located
within a city of 140 000 inhabitants in the western
part of Switzerland and serves a population area of
300 000. The hospital is a complex with 6 main units
(Figure 1). In 2007, telecommunication within the
hospital relied on copper (coax cables) landlines and a
paging system, including the in-hospital Cardiac
Arrest Team Call System. There was no internal
mobile phone network, except for private ones
(personal ownership), which were only partially
effective because of the lack of internal antennas.
At that time the hospital already had a dedicated
internal incident and disaster plan as well as a
command-and-control organization staffed by team
members who received alarms by the paging system.
The hospital also had special landlines that were not
part of the hospital network routing (redundant);
these were based on a different central exchange and
were effective between the hospital’s central call
center, the hospital’s central command control center,
the state’s command and control center, local ﬁre-
ﬁghters, and police services.
On May 21, 2007, at 8:29 pm, a storm hit the city of
Lausanne and its surrounding districts with 220
lightning strikes over a period of 40 minutes. One
struck close to the hospital. The chronology of the
incident is detailed in Table 1.
DISCUSSION
The hospital was not directly struck by lightning,
such as the event previously reported in Belgium.1
However, the electromagnetic wave after the strike
seriously damaged all 3 telephone exchange centers
(indirect impact), burning 25 sensitive connective
cards; thus, 95% of the 8500 hospital phones were out
of order. The wave did not affect the power supply or
the computer network. The state emergency dispatch
center, which used the same technical center for
communication, had 2 lines that were not seriously
damaged by the incident. Neither the hospital nor the
telecommunications provider had sufﬁcient replace-
ment cards on hand to repair the hospital network.
The time of the incident, during the evening, is
typically when activity in the hospital is less intense.
One critical situation occurred in the pediatric ward,
when a patient had a massive hemorrhage 4 days after a
tonsillectomy. The nurse in charge of the patient sent all
staff present in the ward to get help (on-call pediatrician,
on-call anesthetist), to the blood bank, and to inform
the operating room to get ready. The situation was
immediately life threatening. There was an increased
delay of 15 minutes to take the patient to the operating
room but no adverse consequences for the patient.
What Are the Necessary Options and
Requirements to Handle Such an Incident?
Most hospitals are equipped with lightning rods;
however, these structures are helpful only in the case
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of a direct lightning impact or strike (3% of incidents). In our
situation, the incident was caused by an electromagnetic
wave after a distant strike (such as in 75% of incidents)
and propagated through the multiplicity of copper phone-
line connections between the hospital buildings and the
central exchange center. For hospitals still using this
technology, the necessary options and/or requirements to face
such a risk are (1) keep the copper lines and equip every
phone (or group of phones) with protection against over-
tension, which is very costly; (2) review the copper line
network to avoid telephone line curls, though hospital
networks are so dense that this may not be a realistic solution;
(3) migrate the copper network to a computer network
(with ﬁberglass optics), which would not be conductive and,
thus, would be resistant to lightning strikes and electro-
magnetic waves; or (4) do nothing. The additional advantage
of the migration from copper to the ﬁberglass option relies
on the redundancy of the optical ﬁbers between buildings
and between ﬂoors.
Cost of the Incident
The cost of the incident was CHF 230 000 (about US $191 800)
for the hardware and the technical services from the private
telecommunications company. The cost for additional security
personnel from a private company was CHF 13 000 (about
US $10 800). Therefore, the total cost was CHF 243 000
(US $202 600), but this amount does not include the
additional working hours of the hospital staff. In France, for
FIGURE 1
Map of the Bugnon Hospital Campus.
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example, lightning is responsible for 11% of all of the costs
reimbursed by insurance companies to hospitals after a similar
unlikely event.2 This incident conﬁrms the need for lightning
protection, which should be considered every time a new
hospital is being built.
Although such an action is not an absolute form of protec-
tion, a lightning-rod network can transform a building into a
Faraday cage, thus lowering the risk of damage in case of a
direct strike. This installation should not be compromised by
installing additional high antennae (radios, telecommunica-
tion). Fiberglass optics and mobile phone technology, today’s
standards for new construction, drastically reduce the risk
related to electromagnetic waves.
Interestingly, a nearby hospital was directly struck by light-
ning shortly before our incident. The strike did not affect
telecommunications but caused a ﬁre within the building that
was quickly managed.
Lessons Learned
After the lightning-strike incident, the hospital decided to
migrate the copper network to a computer network con-
nected with ﬁberglass optics. As a residual risk persisted, a
second decision was to deploy a redundant parallel telephone
system: an internal low-power mobile phone network that
replaced the paging system. The two networks (the ﬁberglass
optic and the mobile phone network) are interoperative but
are not interdependent. During an incident or during main-
tenance tasks, a switch from one network to the other is
possible and effective.
Fire, loss of power, and the complete or partial loss of
telecommunication are major risks for hospitals. Plans should
exist for such events, as they do for multiple-case-casualties
and nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical, and explosive
(NRBCE) disasters, and staff should be fully trained for any of
these internal “act of God” circumstances. In our hospital, a
speciﬁc plan for a telecommunications breakdown did not
exist at the time of the incident. Since then, the control
command team, led by the head of the emergency depart-
ment, has undergone multiple training sessions to assess the
time needed to gather its members and to test its efﬁciency
in multiple scenarios. The team has also functioned during
real incidents, such as the arrival of multiple casualties.
Since the telecommunications breakdown in 2007, we
have been confronted many times with landline or mobile
telecommunications failures, either during maintenance work
TABLE 1
Chronology of the Lightning Strike Incident
May 21, 2007
8:30 pm: The hospital’s central call center informs the national telecommmunications operator, the head of the call center, and the head of hospital
technical services that the hospital has lost all landlines and the internal paging system. There was no loss of electrical power and no computer system
breakdown was observed.
8:35 pm: The head of the central command team (emergency department’s chief) is informed by the call center on his personal mobile phone; he returns
immediately to the hospital to lead the central command team and center.
8:50 pm: The hospital’s central call center conﬁrms that the special landlines dedicated to the hospital’s central command team are in service.
8:55 pm: The head of hospital security, the head of the technical services department, and the head of general direction are informed of the incident by
personal mobile phone.
8:55 pm: The ﬁrst measures are decided: the general use of personal mobile phones is suggested, ideally near building windows to allow better-quality
transmission. Security personnel, equipped with radios and mobile phones, are sent to strategic sites (the main reception area of the emergency
department, the central command team room, the central call center, the intensive care unit, the operating room) and to all major buildings (the
orthopedics hospital, the women’s hospital, the infectious diseases hospital, the rehabilitation hospital) to inform personnel on duty of the incident.
9:00 pm: A major in-hospital incident is declared: personnel from the central command team and more security agents are called at home and are
expected to be on site in the next 20 minutes.
9:30 pm: The head of emergency, leading the central command team, decides to dispatch 13 more security agents to strategic points within the main
building of the hospital (one on each ﬂoor).
9:30 pm: The Swisscom telecommunications provider arrives on-site: 5 net cards and 28 connective cards are out of service in the 2 central units. In
addition, 90% of the landlines in the main hospital building and 100% in the rehabilitation hospital are out of order.
10:00 pm: Some repair has been performed, and other required replacement pieces are being shipped from central Switzerland (130 km, a 2-hour drive).
May 22, 2007
3:20 am: The replacement pieces arrive and repair work is in progress.
3:50 am: In the main building, 70% of the landlines are functional.
5:00 am: The in-hospital cardiac arrest team call number is once again functional.
5:20 am: The central command team decides to cancel the elective surgery program starting at 7:00 am.
7:00 am: The central command team and the general director of the hospital decide to maintain the elective surgery program. A short communiqué about
the incident is transmitted to the local media and on the hospital intranet; the local population is asked to not to call the hospital.
7:30 am: Security personnel are placed in front of the main buildings to inform incoming workers about the situation. The new net cards and connective
cards arrive from central Switzerland and are installed: 500 more phone lines are functional again.
11:40 am: All landlines are functional in the main building.
12:00 pm: The central command team and the general director declare the end of the major incident.
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or unannounced incidents. On every occasion, 1 of the 2
telecommunication systems was functional. As a redundant
measure during those incidents, we also deployed more
security personnel with radios to secure sensitive commu-
nications, in particular between rapid response teams,
intensive care units, operating rooms, and the emergency
department.
When dealing with disasters or major incidents,
hospitals mainly focus their training on surge capacity and
the arrival of multiple casualties. In-hospital incidents
deserve as much attention and training. Testing the control
command team operation under internal hospital incidents
is easier to organize and not as costly as simulating the
arrival of multiple casualties and should be done at least
once a year.
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